← As consciousness proceeds into self-consciousness, it is forced into contact with another ego. The mediation of this contact is apparently necessary. Something to do with infinity and dynamic unities and the law of inversion and life. I am not convinced.
For the in-itself, or the universal result of the relation of the Understanding to the inwardness of things, is the distinguishing of what is not to be distinguished, or the unity of what is distinguished. But this unity is, as we have seen,just as much its repulsion from itself; and this Notion sunders itself into the antithesis of self-consciousness and life : the former is the unity for which the infinite unity of the differences is ; the latter, however, is only this unity itself, so that it is not at the same time for itself. [168]
I am not convinced.
Seeking sense and meaning in Hegel
I would not be the first to criticize Hegel for obfuscating meaning. But I am wary of slashing wildly, not least because of the hubris that presumes there is no meaning in a place others have insisted is so fertile.
Boiled down, my experience and perception of Hegel is as follows:
- His writings contain many valuable ideas
- Some of those ideas can be isolated
- And sometimes applied fruitfully in differing contexts
- And some of what surrounds them is essentially redundant
- While some is not redundant, but unnecessary for many interpretations
- Some tracts that appear ill-formed may be “prone” to meaning, functioning like an I Ching
- Text that is a mix of meaning and chaos, that rewards investigation and imagination
- But some readings appear as no more than mental gymnastics
- Some readings prove the adroitness only of the interpreter
In reading some parts of Hegel or his followers, I am reminded of the dense systems of the late Neoplatonists or dizzyingly self-referential Scholastics. An analogy that comes to mind is – Kafkaesque bureaucracies.
Seeking my own meaning
But the point here, now, is that it does not matter that I don’t follow all of Hegel. I can follow what appears to be more idiosyncratic (and frankly popular) in his strands of writing, and isolate and contextualize meanings as I find them.
Which brings me to the setting of section two of Phenomenology of Spirit, at its beginning: A simple self-consciousness meets another. Perhaps the first it ever has. At least the first it considers in relation to itself. But am I to imagine a cave-man or wolf-child glimpsing sight of another bipedal creature? Without answering, I move on, aware that this question of context remains uncapped.
Self-consciousness has “desire” – a need to consume and negate all that is other. Why? I consider man as a biological entity, mandated to consume and control. But is “desire” to be understood as a form of hunger? As an exercise in phenomenology, I’m expecting Hegel to explain what self-consciousness does because it is a consciousness. And because of the pattern of this particular book, I’m expecting Hegel to explain why self-consciousness’s judgment of reality is problematic and forced to mutate.
What is the first meeting of an other?
Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness [175]
In order to understand this meeting of minds, I establish how it differs. A simple scenario – walking forward and meeting another object – with variations:
- There is a rock in my way: I move around it or move it away.
- There is a weed growing where I will be stepping: I step on it.
- There is a cat moving to cross my path: I keep moving, knowing that it must move around me.
- There is a person moving to cross my path…
Meditating on these makes me aware of their significance. A rock is a nothing; at most a tool of mine. Similarly, a weed is destroyed without pause. Whilst I don’t want to hurt a cat, I know that is must submit to me. In this way, it is essentially a thing (like a rock) but with a power of moving around. As for a person crossing my path…
Thinking about what a mind must process in these scenarios helps me makes sense of Hegel’s term “desire”. From the text, I know that it stems from the mind’s incorporating things into itself. But that is purely mental. I expand my understanding to give “desire” practical scope.
“Desire” as fundamental subjugation of all
I interpret “desire” as the need to subjugate. Not in the sense of a compulsion to collect the submission of all that could possibly exist. Rather, the need to relate everything to my need. The only consideration of my actions where I meet another is: what does it do for me? The word “desire” remains apt because it is an instinct, an urge preceding thought, and a principle that traps everything within the sphere of “I” and makes it subject to “my” will.
Everything I do to things, I do for me. Even the things I don’t want are consumed by my desire: they become nothing in principle, and if in my way, also in fact. I step on the weed because it is nothing (my desire destroyed it). I don’t step on a flower because it is mine (my desire).
The outcome of the first meeting
Now, what happens when “I” and another “I” meet? When their path’s cross?
…they are for one another like ordinary objects, independent shapes, individuals submerged in the being of Life [186]
When I see another for the first time, then it just a thing with particular powers (movement, etc). “You” are just another “that”, and by law of my mind, defined by my desire. When you are in my way I should push you aside, so that you won’t be in my way. And if I move around you or let you move around me, it is only because that is easier for me, or because I know you have the power of moving around. At no point does your own convenience enter my mind. Beyond your function in my life you have no reality.
But it is not just a matter of one pushing another. Hegel states that this meeting results in a life and death struggle! This forces me to pause again. I must rethink the trajectory of meaning if “desire” causes this struggle.
Seeking sense and meaning in Hegel #2
Before I try to answer that question, I note the pattern of interpretation forced onto this reader by Hegel’s text. I notice and point out that even on a larger scale (let alone sentence-by-sentence) mismatch of expectations forces me to be creative and contort paradigms and imagined theories in order to make the puzzle pieces fit.
I had found a valuable idea in “desire”. And a valuable question in the phenomenology of the scenario. But it is not obvious why “desire” and the scenario so understood should lead to a mortal struggle. I am biased to find meaning in the struggle in such a way that I can retain my reading so far. But this is an idiosyncrasy. I could just so find meaning in the struggle on its own, and then with that understanding in hand, look back to find a meaning in “desire” that still fits. The point I am making is to illustrate how Hegel can promote discovery of meaning, even through texts that some argue are merely mimicry of wisdom or filled with confusion.
Reviewing the concepts
The presentation of itself, however, as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing itself as the pure negation of its objective mode, or in showing that it is not attached to any specific existence, not to the individuality common to existence as such, that it is not attached to life. [187]
I review all the major concepts in play:
- A meeting between “self-conscious” entities, as if for the first time
- These entities have “desire” to consume and negate everything
- Also, a need to prove their independence from everything including their own life
- Also, a need for recognition, so that their self-certainty be manifest
- A resultant mortal struggle
Some of these principles appear arbitrary. For instance, why is the need of “desire” or the need for independence primary? There could be similarly convincing and engaging needs posited, for example, a need to understand everything, or a need to ensure the continuation of one’s own life and immunity from its destruction.
The major concepts as I’ve written them are each of them rich and thought-provoking. Thus they are capable of being undertaken on their own, engaged, interpreted, and elaborated. Similarly, each could act as a focus and leverage for interpreting the others, or the collection as a whole. My particular expression of them as it stands is suggestive of a particular interpretation, but others are possible.
A wrap-up and a slave
Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged. [178]
In any case, here’s a practical reading and illustration. Imagine once more two entities, walking towards each other. They are each of them a “thing” to the other, and so both push the other out of its way. Both have “desire” as a fundamental characteristic. This explains why they treat each other as tools or obstacles. But it also means that they treat their own existence as a vehicle for their consciousness, and thus not just willing to risk their own life, but feel the need to do so. By risking their life, each is acting to prove and strengthen their conception of their life as a subject, as something which must serve their (qua self-consciousness) need. The proof that everything exists in relation to themselves is tested each time they act upon a thing, and it is being challenged by each other. If only the other would recognize “I”, then the other would fulfill the “desire” of “I” in a way that other things can’t. This possibility is destroyed along with the loser of the struggle, and so self-consciousness learns that there might be some benefit in allowing the other to live – as a slave…
Miscellaneous
- Cats with minds: Is the modern conception of animals a humanized one? But if this is a possibility, then couldn’t a primitive ego similarly treat any thing, i.e. out there, as a form of consciousness? Which raises the problem – why is Hegel so adamant that mutual recognition must be just that, i.e. mutual, after all, what is the difference if one ego merely believes that the other recognizes them back? That would mean that the challenge for “I” isn’t precisely to be recognized; the challenge is to manipulate appearances so as to allow (or enable) the “I” to believe per appearances that they are being recognized. This is a distinction Hegel could have raised, even if only to us, i.e. the reader.
- When it dies, the consciousness puts an end to its “consciousness in its alien setting of natural existence” [188]. Nb. the aptness of this expression: the alien setting of natural existence – natural existence is itself alien to the consciousness that perceives itself as alien to existence; a traveler who finds themselves here (but without any origin there) and who can only justify the fact of experience (no matter how immediate), by its novelty, i.e. its foreignness that proves that its nature is like passing scenery.
