← I’ve already written about Hegel’s master/slave dialectic, but Charles Taylor’s “Hegel” emphasizes the link between this section and Hegel’s aim to provide a philosophical base for man’s authentic expression, and for man’s place in the universe – expressivism – which were areas of focus for the post-Kantian generation.
The goal of self-consciousness
This point of The Phenomenology of Spirit takes off from a mode of being called “Consciousness” – a being that perceived the world as an other, and tried to make sense of its existence by testing its knowledge of these other things.
Here, a transition has been made into a shape called “Self-Consciousness”, which subsumed “Consciousness”, and which now seeks its truth by testing its knowledge of itself. Hence its dialectic is between our idea of ourselves (called self-certainty) and what we actually are (called the truth).
Transitions occur for our self-consciousness when our attempt to act out our ideas of self-certainty leads them to being undermined (and replaced). This dialectic is motivated by our aspiration for (what Taylor calls) “integral expression”, an idea linked with that of infinite (i.e. in which a subject is not restricted from without, because for it there is nothing beyond itself). A fully achieved integral expression entails an external reality which is fully expressive of us, and without anything alien to us. It could only truly occur via Geist (i.e. the end-point of the book), but at this stage of development is sought via “desire” (i.e. the drive to incorporate everything into oneself, or to consider any thing in terms of its relation to oneself).
The final shape of “Consciousness” had a reality that “repelled itself from itself” – i.e. was predicated on force that manifested itself externally when presented to another – and it followed that the external manifestations were identical with the thing’s inner idea. By contrast, the objects for “Self-Consciousness” are (1) its outer object as embodiment (i.e. the external manifestation of itself), and (2) the objects of its desire (i.e. which have their being in presenting themselves to consciousness).
Note that “integral expression” fits obviously into Hegel’s larger project that including expressivism, and into the overall narrative of this book – i.e. which seeks to define man’s existence as being inherent in nature per his expressions in life being also expressions of nature (or reality).
Self-consciousness finding itself
To understand why and how self-consciousness seeks expression, it is helpful to consider 3 potential inadequacies. Note that these inadequacies occur in terms of self-certainty, i.e. its expression only makes sense for itself per its certainty that it is expression reflects true self. Now, self-certainty can fail when, (1) it depends on a reality that does not reflect Geist (nb. this is conspicuous in the desiring self-consciousness that seeks recognition); or when (2) it is merely temporarily happy because it is unconscious of this failure to reflect Geist (nb. exemplified in the “master”); or when (3) it retreats from the challenge by dismissing the significance of the world (nb. exemplified in the stoic and skeptic).
Self-consciousness at this point would need, in order to achieve integrity, to negate an other without abolishing it. In other words, it wants reality to contain something (or someone) that itself expresses the consciousness. Or again, it wants to find something that in itself acknowledges the perspective of our self-consciousness, which would be proof (for our self-consciousness) outside of itself that all that is, is for self-consciousness.
And as we readers know, this plays itself out in the mortal struggle, which is followed by the establishment of a master and his slave.
Some notes on the mortal struggle and its outcome
Taylor explains that the conflict occurs (as opposed to a suitable and relatively amicable mutual recognition) because the proponents are undeveloped men. That is, the actors have not realized themselves as universals – to do so is to see that recognition for me is recognition for man as such.
Skipping forward to the slave: It experiences the lesson of a near-death experience, which combines with its experience of work to transform the slave (i.e. for itself) a universal consciousness. It is this that allows him to see in the objects he has made or worked on, a world that is the reflection of himself as universal; a reflection of the ideas and models he applied to the objects, which were themselves universal concepts; he sees that the objects manifest universal ideas, which are kin to the universal ideas that form the substance of his own being.
Conclusion and general notes about this section
In addition to various clarifications, the main insight I took from my reading of Taylor was the significance of self-certainty as a standard against which self-consciousness measures expression (and which is itself a fundamental feature of subject in general, although experienced here as a drive, or desire).
I take the opportunity to express my own dissatisfaction with some of the creative choices Hegel made in writing this section:
- Some elements seem arbitrary – they add to the discussion and interest of the text, but don’t feel to be necessary. This is an issue endemic to Hegel’s writings.
- I’d included within the charge of “arbitrary” even the whole placement of the master/slave section within the Phenomenology‘s linear (ascension of consciousness) narrative. This sudden introduction of the idea of intersubjectivity (and its significance of consciousness) is fascinating, but seems to be a lone interjection on Hegel’s part. Why here and now, and was it really necessary for connecting a consciousness of things to a consciousness based on thought?
- And another instance – the whole mortal fear motif (e.g. as combining with work in the slave’s experience) is interesting, but doesn’t even appear necessary, and could be worked around with ease. This instance can serve as an example and place-holder for other aspects that are internal to the master/slave text but are arbitrary to it.
