Epiphenomenalism:
The thorn of dualism is to bridge two things that have been defined in opposition. Recognized approaches towards tackling this gap include interactionism (there is a third thing that unites), supervenience (mind manifests from matter), and epiphenomenalism (mind exists as an effect of matter without being a cause itself).
Epiphenomenalism is the least intuitive of this triad, as it denies our mind the volition we identify with ourselves. In this sense, it is even more limiting than supervenience. Supervenience allows that thoughts may cause thoughts, although ultimately it is the matter that is fundamental and mind is a manifestation in parallel explicable in its own terms.
The mind cannot move itself or its body any more than a shadow can move itself or its host. If I sense pain and then cry, or if I think fearfully and my heart rate increases, in neither case is mind-affecting matter. The material or physiological underpinnings of each precursor (e.g. sensing pain) whilst causing a mental phenomenon (e.g. the experience of pain) also causes each outcome. By analogy, the sequence of a moving shadow cast by a moving vehicle is not caused by anything in the shadow (i.e. the vehicle is the cause of both its own sequential movement and of the shadow’s placement at each moment).
Evolutionary biology implies that the epiphenomenal mind is at least selectively neutral and probably inevitable.
There is an objection sourced in evolutionary biology, namely that natural selection generates features on the basis of advantage. If the mind has no effect then it cannot have been selected. I suggest that this implies that for epiphenomenalism to be true it must be the case that the mind is an inevitable outcome, in this way akin to negative properties of positive features (e.g. the weight of a heavy fur coat).
Experiments suggest material underpinnings of choice precede its awareness.
Another scientific approach to the problem involves experiments that attempt to relate the awareness of choice with neurological/material indications of choice. The results are not without their controversy but seem to indicate that there are material indicators of choice prior to any awareness. This can be elaborated by reference to the brain’s chronology-in-architecture as the arrangement of information in the brain, including its presentation to consciousness, is a feature of its wiring and not inherent in the passage of time.
Studies suggest independence of consciousness for operations but possibly not for their situation within behaviour.
Another relevant study paradigm is cases where a function has been retained but not its awareness. An example is a person who can point upon instruction to an object but claims not to see it. This is intriguing because on the one hand consciousness does not seem necessary for successful operation, but then again the ablated consciousness does seem to affect behaviour surrounding the operation (e.g. confusion as to whether it is possible to commit the task).
May need to acknowledge our inability to link physiology to mind and hence stop seeking exceptions.
That is not conclusive. It can be just as easily argued that the apparent effect on behaviour is yet another instance of physical processes having mental outcomes, and that the confusion in discussing this is the result of any attempt to understand higher processes as an epiphenomenon of physiology, especially any attempt using language.
But that’s not to prevent another question on the same matter: what does it mean for the study to observe that the person could conduct themselves unconsciously in a case normally associated with (at least the possibility of) awareness? First of all, based on what was suggested above, I would not take this to mean consciousness has no importance for survival. To conclude so is to miss the point of consciousness. To reiterate, the mind is an epiphenomenon, and thus a loss of mental scope implies a loss of physiological processes.
It is (at least) useful to consider mental processes as metaphors of physiological processes, and thus a loss of the former implies a loss of the latter even though we can only describe the latter by metaphorical reference to the former. It is senseless to speak of a shadow’s flaws except by analogy, and even then it is easily misleading.
The above helps explain what it means for the mind to be an epiphenomenon, but it does not justify that it is so. The validity of this theory is based on intelligibility and aesthetics.
Epiphenomenalism is (arguably) more elegant (per Occam) than interactionism.
In a less straightforward manner, it is also (arguably) more elegant than supervenience.
Nb. “Arguably” is the key term in the above two statements, and the converse could similarly be argued.
