Meta: I have written about epiphenomenalism on the 28-29th October, and will continue to do so here in parallel with my reading of the IEP article on the subject (beginning at section 4 therein).
The 18-19th centuries assumed dualism and scientific naturalism, but given the observation that there was no need (for instance) to postulate the mental in order to explain neurophysiology (i.e. material mechanisms are sufficient), then there a “No gap” in which to place the mind. Thus epiphenomenalism.
There is the “Problem of mental causation,” that is used to say, (given dualism) “It is impossible that the mind should affect the body and therefore this must be an illusion,” (i.e. epiphenomenalism). To this we can add other relevant arguments:
- Anomalous monism (David Donaldson): The mental aspect of an event is independent of the physical aspect and its physical ability to cause an effect (i.e. this is a particular paradigm for explaining epiphenomenalism).
- Externalism (aka anti-individualism, see below for definition). Externalism says that “the content of mental states and the meaning of some natural language terms is a relational, or extrinsic, rather than a local, or intrinsic, property”. It pains me to be honest (I wink, tongue in cheek) and acknowledge that I am currently unable to provide an explanation for this perspective of epiphenomenalism.
Meta: The IEP article moves onto section 5, “Libet’s Experiments,” discussing scientific research relating to a belief that underlies epiphenomenalism, namely “There is a relationship (that we sense) between our thoughts and ‘consequent’ bodily actions and thoughts.”
