An important principle I have absorbed is that while the edifice of philosophy have their values, unless one is viewing them as an historian then they are also merely tools and words; useful but not to be confused with philo-sophia: love of knowledge.
Let’s raise the question, “Why read philosophical treatises?”
First, it can inspire. But it can be valuable even when approached more directly, when one reads the text in a personally critical manner. By critical, I include such methodologies as, “What question is being asked?” and “How would I answer this question?” and also “How do I evaluate the answer offered?”
I had been reading Étienne Bonnot de Condillac. Below’s notes are intended to offer a summary of his philosophy, but includes remarks of a weakly critical nature reflecting a personal reading.
His contemporaries were aware that the light from three-dimensional objects imprinted a two-dimensional image on the back wall of the eye. How do we see 3-D objects? In his early work, he rejects the standard view (without explaining an alternative) and argues that there cannot be inferences made on a sensation of which we are not aware. He later sought to overcome this argument, by realizing that unconscious operations of the mind do occur, as when we fail to pay attention to something in our vision. In other words, he agreed with what others had said, that we see 3-D objects via unconscious processing. That’s not a direct answer, but I assume that he’s transferred the goal into answering, “Why don’t we appreciate 3-D synthesis?” Note the assumptions that we must be aware of certain cognitive processing (but see below for additional comments on this particular question and his particular answering).
Consider experiences that have unveiled some phenomenon of life, of which I could potentially have been aware insofar as my life could lead to its awareness. But then consider that within the range of these same potential experiences, are those for which I could not even be aware that I was unaware, and that requires some leap of consciousness to incorporate and be thought about. This is a version of the “don’t know what you don’t know” type. Although this is not the only mode of thought that can be applied, he was in fact interested here in attention, and knew that even attention needed to be learned – it was learned in practice by the mind’s filtering information based on needs and interests.
A side note: Since by default attention is modified upon the screen of experience according to interest and need, that that it occurs by some instinct, this allows that it could be controlled more consciously. In other words, roughly, attention is controlled by instincts but can be controlled (at least more than it is) by will.
To better understand the contents of sensation, he considered this by use of the thought experiment of a statue that becomes animated one sense at a time… this leads to the conclusion that senses operate on the mind (surprise!?). Via this illustration, he acknowledges that the experienced self does not differentiate itself from its senses instinctively, but only does so after learning to do so. He awards to touch the lesson of external objects that are separate in space from the self. In other words, we are our perceptions, and both the creation of ideas and of modes of knowing are extra features that are modifications dependent on consciousness.
Allow me to return temporarily to the question of 3-D processing; note the lesson of the animated statue. We are our vision, although due to other features of our consciousness, we come to associate less with it and even reach the conclusion that vision refers to an externality. In addition to the actual sense data (e.g. a field of red) we know that we see extra features (e.g. 3-D) – these are modifications only possible due to consciousness, although (as said above) the actual mechanism is subconscious. [Perhaps I might add that due the process of epistemological reasoning involved here, a Condillac philosopher could add that a feature like a dimensionality is added to consciousness via consciousness placing the entire I into space. Doing so would be akin to the way that a de novo I (incl. one that has less epistemic axioms in play) believing itself to be its sense data].
A separate issue: His explanation for the origin of language is one I find reasonable. He identifies natural signs, such as a cry in response to an attack by a wild animal. He suggests that these are adopted, and separated from their original stimulus, and become the basis for a collection of natural signs that become instituted signs and develop into a proper language. Having established this model, he goes on to say that language is vital for the discriminatory and scope of consciousness. Certainly, ideas or distinctions must be identified before they can be considered or sought in their own right.
