[207/42] Stb: The UC is *like* a spirt, in that it contains two parts, and also their unity. But it is not aware of this, and so experiences itself as both, then as one when it identifies itself as both, but thus returns again. The “two” I’m referring to are self as immutable and self as mutable (via the duplication, as #206 calls it, of skepticism). [208] Returning movements:...
Life: Born 1770 Stuttgart Cf. 1789 fall of Bastille Cf. 1806 Napoleon’s Battle of Jena Cf. French dominion over Germany (1806-1814) included substantial reform (incl. abolishment of serfdom, proto-revolutionary attempts) 1799 inheritance (father’s death) allowed him to stop being a family-tutor and join the University of Jena, where previously Fichte and Schilling had been, and...
The paradigm whereby rationality = vision of cosmic order = self-presence, Taylor calls an “inarticulate limit of thought”, insofar as it was presupposed, and preceded the possibility of consideration in itself. Enlightenment as an attempt to amalgamate two views: man as generator of objectivity, and (thence) man as subject of nature – nb. tension. The desacralizing efforts of...
————– B.IV.B. Stoicism et al. ————– Re. stoicism: “The retreat towards inner self-identity cannot bring freedom for an embodied subject whose real freedom must thus be externally expressed in a way of life. Stoicism is thus in contradiction with itself, it is a putative realization of freedom which is, in fact, its negation. As...
Must (self) consciousness have “desire” or is it rather the case that is only through desire that self-consciousness can experience? His reasoning for why desire must concern life is obtuse; something about it having to confront infinity (which refers to more garble back in the previous section) and infinity necessarily including life, etc ad absurdum. SC is defined as “the...
Having already written about Hegel's master/slave dialectic, I read and describe Charles Taylor's interpretation of this section. I attend to what Taylor says about the mechanisms underlying this dialectic; why self-consciousness is motivated to challenge another.
When I first read Hegel on "the unhappy consciousness", I struggled to make sense of it; a strange conversation gave it new meaning. The epiphany came about as we started talking about why dogs are so happy; why a dog's life can be said to be perfect, and enviable too! And not just any dogs - domesticated dogs. What we seem to want is an external standard and confirmation of our purpose...
Reading Hegel about a form of consciousness he calls "unhappy", because not only does it define itself as a dichotomy, but it divides and separates the aspect of itself that it feels to be unchangeable and essential. This leaves a self that sees itself as a changing transience, and that strives to relate to the truth, i.e. to the unchanging aspect of itself which was divested, and Hegel sees this...
Reading Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit for the first time. Here I've read the first part of section B "Self-consciousness", chapter IV "The truth of self-certainty", part B "Freedom of self-consciousness". That elaborate indexing adumbrates the topic matter: Hegel's studying a self-conscious entity, whose basis for truth is its certainty of its own self, and which (just now) is acquiring the...
Charles Taylor's reading of Hegel on "sense-certainty" is informed by his understanding of the intellectual ecosystem from which Hegel's philosophy grew, esp. the German Romantics. It can be simplified as a desire to provide an intellectual basis for human expression, and for a unity between man and nature. These ideas can be seen as goals paralleling the main thrust of "Sense-certainty".
