Compare for example Beit Hillel and Beit Shamai on washing hands before bread, and which parts of table-setting may be touched without concern for purity (for potential Teruma):
[Is this seen in Brachot 8.4?][I]
Does this show that when they are called lenient & strict (i.e. in those few cases which are said to be the cases where this occurs) that they are concerned with the strictness of what must be done, and not with what must be kept in mind?
Is Rabbi Yossi adding something new to the text that is not already included? Since it is already known that something that is more lenient in instructions is called lenient, then what is being learned?
Since it is not known why meat and milk are separated, it cannot be due to the law’s purpose.
What’s more, the law of meat/milk is mostly concerned with the fencing of the law.
However, fencing of law is also pertinent in case of touching food-surroundings, since Teruma is only conceivable, not imminent.
I do not know if this question is reasonable. I wonder regarding the final Mishna in 8 Chullin, which concerns the range of restriction, insofar as that range goes past what is originally pertinent.
Furthermore, it is known that this is a 3-fold law (cook, eat, enjoy). Also despite the allegorical explanation (compassion or not being cold-hearted even when no one is being hurt any longer), it is known/taught that this law is not understood.
Does this allow a limited explanation of the above? If so, then the reason for “not understanding” is precisely the core of the law, since it is a law of what doesn’t matter.
If so, is Hillel more protective in these matters? And does Shammai emphasize the mental-training once the original context has been passed a certain distance?
Nb. although it is agreed to apply to meats, the word for goat-kid is used, whose letters are the minimal maturation (gimmel upwards into space of vav where daled appears, and the yud can occur back on the space of gimmel).
From this reading, can bring interpretations into discussions. E.g. do we concern those who are not capable of loss as being representations for suffering based on such loss? (E.g. Rabbi Yossi Ha-Geleli says since birds have no milk…). Or, how closely do associations have to occur in order to cause cross-habituation such that we have ignored the appearance of a simulacrum of cruelty.
It is seen that various domains are taught simultaneously, e.g. Shabbat 1.1 regarding charity and laws of Shabbat per se. If so, what does it teach that these laws are also used to learn the importance of giving newly unfinished-maturing produce to Temple?
Perhaps like it is known that to sacrifice an animal results in the animal’s physicality becoming spiritual, in parallel with its chaining? i.e. that just as sacrifices are both capable of being rationalized (for our benefit) and not capable (metaphysical limit), so too morality, which we employ both as we understand, and a chain which implies that our morality is but a tool (from the 4-armed Shin’s perspective – and this relates to the crossing of Yabook which occurs at Vav, and to the arm of Teffilin which causes our emotional morality to be taught beyond what can be learned; nb. Maturation is taught from Imma via shoulder into the intellect of the child despite their still being unconnected to their intellect).
The discussions also inform the “You shall not eat anything that has died a natural death; give it to the stranger in your community to eat, or you may sell it to a foreigner. For you are a people consecrated to Yhwh your God. You shall not boil a kid in its mother’s milk.” Since the discussion concerns how far we impose values which pass their own effective-horizon, cf. There are beliefs which we recognize do not need to be applied to others.
[I] The source is in Mishanah Brachot, Chapter 8, tractate 2: “Bet Shammai says: they wash their hands and then they pour the cup [of wine]. Bet Hillel says: they pour the cup [of wine] and then they wash their hands.”
