The significance of Reason was not immediately apparent for me. At first it seemed no different, except by semantic quibbles, from thought. In retrospect this occurred because when I scrutinized what would be a mind that self-defined as Reason, what I was actually considering was a rational mind. And a rational mind could be just a thinking mind whose thoughts all conformed to some (logical) set of laws. It followed that Reason (erroneously) qua rational mind was a self-consciousness that existed in and as rational thoughts. That would be fine, except that it did not seem to fulfil the vision of an ascending consciousness as Hegel was ostensibly describing in his book.
Having thus described (what I now consider to be) an error will allow contrast to be perceived, as I elaborate my later (putatively improved) understanding. At the core of that understanding of Reason is a theory of what drives the dialectic of consciousness in general, and of Reason in particular. This needs to be presented and accepted first, before any further explanation of Reason, and then held in mind throughout the explanation of Reason’s journey.
Measuring existence; the place of Reason in existence
All shapes of consciousness carry assumptions about their awareness, and in evaluating their character in the world, they all measure those assumptions. For Reason this assumption can be presented as, “The mechanics of my being are reason, and the mechanics of the world (that my being experiences) are that selfsame reason too.” To the extent that a person of Reason can experience that assumption made manifest, is the extent to which they can make sense of their existence.
This shall be worth revisiting repeatedly alongside the rest of the text. It needs to be considered as one makes sense of Reason making observations, fulfilling desires, etc. It is too long and unwieldy to be inserted into the text as often as might be beneficial, and generally it is only possible to make allusions (e.g. to the standard that Reason is testing, and why). What follows is based in the chapter “Reason” as it has already been described, and the particular twists and turns Reason is made to follow by Hegel are signified in outline only.
Comprehending Observing Reason
Reason practises empirical studies – seeking patterns and laws that might explain plain matter, animate life, and the human being. There is an axiom here which needs to be stated explicitly, because otherwise it is not only neglected but even presumed null. Thus: presume that the empirical world is rational and amenable to human reason. (Only by stating this aloud do I appreciate the radical and existential significance of science).
Reason must move on beyond science, which failed to fulfil consciousness’s particular requirement (viz. that it make sense to itself). Science does echo this goal, but it ultimately falls short. The discoveries of science are (to the present needs) merely contingencies. They don’t demonstrate the dyadic relationship of Reason. They show that things are comprehended by one’s own reason, although any particular rule is cosmically arbitrary. This will contrast with the end of this chapter, when Reason sights ethical substance, which does demonstrate the relationship sought, and which does allow rules to be comprehended that are also justified.
Comprehending active Reason
The path within the second subsection is obtuse; an abrupt change from a sort of desire to types of ethical commitments. I can (both, first) break these down and understand them in their turn, and (later) derive and describe an overarching trajectory.
The “drive” here is the same as it was around science, namely a need for existential coherence within consciousness. Here Reason aims for fulfilment by intending to experience a world that exists to serve its wants. This is an incredibly narcissistic view, presuming that everything is a manifestation of oneself including one’s desires. The fact that one can take and enjoy anything would be proof of this relation. This is almost identical to the consciousness of the master in the first chapter (of the Phenomenology of Spirit). Here the philosophy is undermined by death, which would end the reason for anything else existing.
In reaction to the problems confronting Reason, it morphs to assume a belief which would salvage the harmony between the world and itself. This is basically a universalization of what it held earlier about desire, except that the focus now is on the individuals who express their will. It is this: the desires of all persons are good. And when this breaks down, then this: all persons are good at heart. What ties these ethics into the development of Reason is that they are attempts at establishing a framework that would allow Reason to be judged in the world. They fail to utterly fulfil Reason, but what causes their break-down is their failure to be practical; as ways of life they contain contradictions.
What’s important here is that their contradiction leads Reason onwards. As before, the rationale for the particularity of the next step is ambiguous, but such is Hegel. Before moving on, I intended to try at a briefer summary.
Here: Reason seeks to experience its truth – that it is the basis for its self and for its experienced world – by living and acting as if it was already sure that this was true. If only Reason could experience itself living and acting thus, then it would have an experience of the truth it were seeking. This involves some practical programme (e.g. spurred by considerations of desires or virtue), but which must necessarily be prone to contradiction. This is because on the one hand Reason is seeking to demonstrate something about universal reality, and on the other hand, it is trying to do so by acting as a particular.
Comprehending citizen Reason
What bridges Reason to its final shape – recognizing its place within its ethical substance – is relatively easy to describe. It stems from (depending on one’s perspective) the requirements Reason was accumulating in its development (i.e. left over after each false start), or a breakdown in the way Reason was defining its challenge. I’ll briefly describe these, each in turn.
One. In order for Reason to know itself it needs to: (i) know that its world is amenable to its reason, but however utilizing reasons that have universal justification; and (ii) know that it is able to profitably practise its own beliefs in its world, but at the same time that those beliefs have universal justification. These (i.e. i and ii) correspond to the lessons Reason accumulated in its “false starts”, and they are what lead Reason, now, to measure itself by its ethical substance (i.e. thus addressing i and ii).
Two: All along Reason has been “acting” as if there was itself and there was a world (despite knowing them both to be itself). This way of thinking breaks down because it is strains “Reason” between an actor (itself) and a world (its experiences). This “strain” would be eschewed if only it were to “think” as if it were the creator of its world. Thus the nature of comprehension must be changed in this way: Consider the trial of science – it investigated a world as if it were alien – (rather) what if the specimens it were investigating were its own handicraft? Or the trial of desire/ethics – (rather) what if the responses it were measuring were its own endorsements?
This train of thought could lead to a “master” like perspective, but that would be a primitive result. Rather (at this stage of development), it leads one to perceive a material/ethical world as I would create it, which to a person who perceives themselves as a member of a people, is the same thing as the material and ethical world of my people (aka civilization).
That is the paradigm shift Reason undergoes. And with that, I’ve fulfilled the aim of this write-up, viz. to reconsider and describe what is meant by the term “Reason”.
