Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was born in Geneva. His mother died about a week after his birth, and after his father had to leave the country due to the risk of imprisonment, he was raised by an uncle. He abandoned his education as an engraver due to his bully employer, and at the mere age of 16, moved to France where he met the first major female figure in his life (Mme de Warens).
He was associated with enlightenment figures in France and England, including a role writing entries for the nascent Encyclopedia. However, he did not share all their values (cf. first and second discourse) and had a falling out with many of them, including with Hume after the latter tried to help Rousseau (inviting him to England, etc).
His “romantic” life is suggestive. And includes two major figures. First, the aforementioned noblewoman, Mme de Warens, and in his early thirties, he met Thérèse Levasseur, an illiterate maid with whom he bore five children in total, all of which he abandoned to a certain grim (and likely fatal) fate in orphanages. From this alone it is simple to presume that Rousseau has “issues”, add in the fact of his poor mother’s fate, and perhaps also the less widely known (and even less savoury) facts of his delight in mooning woman in the street and his fetish for spanking, and one gets some sort of “mommy issues”. But that is not the least of his problems (if one must call these problems at all!), since there is also the fact of Rousseau’s heightened sense of persecution, i.e. paranoia. It is this psychosis which ultimately broke up his fragile relationship with the encyclopedists (nb. a fragility that resulted at least from his counter-Enlightenment philosophy), and also caused him to escape England where he had sheltered under the kindly wing of Hume.
…men are crazy […] because to be sane in a world of madmen is in itself a kind of madness.
[A Lasting Peace Through the Federation of Europe; And, the State of War, Loc 771-771]
Aside from intellectual differences, psychoses were not Rousseau’s only character flaw. I suspect that he was a self-righteous self-promoter. For instance, behind the anecdote of how he came about to know about the competition which won him fame (for his first discourse), viz. that he was on his way to (like a good saint) to visit his friend (like a good friend) Diderot in prison (who he knew as a member of the French intellectuals). That is obviously a fact bundled in conjecture, but the latter is buffered by (further conjectures on) comments he makes, for instance (again referring to the first discourse) he writes (to the effect of saying) that he is brave enough to risk offence since he is defending virtue, etc, nb. written in romantic prose.
Some more things I want to write:
Rousseau doesn’t seem to have an epistemology as such. The closest he comes to developing one is (insofar as I can tell) in Emlie, in his description of the tutor. That tutor utilizes something like the Cartesian method (doubt followed by a search for truth), which along with an “Inner light” allows him to identify truths too intimate to be doubted. Primary examples include the facts that he is a being, distinct from its body, and with free will.
The will is known to me in its action, not in its nature. [Emile; p282]
I continue after an extended hiatus:
Rousseau is most famous for his ideas regarding society and its effects on the individual. In brief, Rousseau says that civilization is responsible for endorsing and effecting negative traits and expressions in its members, and thus that this contrasts with man in the state of nature. Rousseau’s primordial man differs fundamentally from Hobbes, as might already be guessed, since he views that man positively (cf. the nasty, brutish and short-lived Hobbesian man). This is written about most famously in Rousseau’s First Discourse, for which he won the prize, but also in his Second Discourse (which entered a later competition but did not win, although it is considered by some modern commentators to be a superior product).
There is obviously very much which can be said (and has been written) about Rousseau on civilization and its arts and sciences, but for now, I choose to describe fragments of Rousseau’s philosophies. The following are (mostly) idiosyncratically selected motifs from within Rousseau’s oeuvre; some are selected for the interest they have provoked in commentators, and others for their aesthetic expression or delineation:
The following three are a related cohort, and together they comprise the fundamentals of Rousseau’s psychology (viz. the emotions which man has natively, and others which he develops from the first, but all together which explain his motivations for interactions with members of his species and society). Nb. the translations given are based on what is commonly selected by modern translators and commentators:
- Amour de soi (trans. self-love). This is the original passion, and is responsible for basic needs (e.g. food and shelter). In other words, this is the motivation every person has to care for themselves, and is felt as a desire to be comfortable for the very sake of oneself.
- Pitie (trans. compassion). This is a passion which develops in the presence of other beings and is care for other beings, and at different places in his writings, it is considered as an original passion in its own right, or alternatively, as a passion which has developed out of the prior amour de soi. It is felt as a regard for the comfort or well-being of others, and is acted upon for the sake of alleviating or satisfying the urges prompted by those feelings.
- Amour propre (trans. love of self). This is a passion felt by members of civilization, and is a self-interested love. It develops out of one’s awareness of others as thinking beings as well as targets of awareness, with the implication that one can be a focus oneself. It is a desire to be focused upon or recognized. As one’s personality and its expression upon reality is exposed to the competing (i.e. in one’s mind) realities of others, the person may feel that their identity and correlative reality are ignored or subdued, and thence desire support (i.e. in the form of recognition). It is often considered negatively by Rousseau, but in parts of his writings, he indicates that if properly developed, it need not be so.
Here are some other concepts, some of which are relatively minor and not normally highlighted:
- Sentiment of existence. This is the conception of oneself, and its changes/develops along with society (viz. just as/like society undergoes transformation along the history of civilization, changing for example in response to changing technologies or social orders, so too it is inevitable that the members of the same society must be different at different stages of society’s developments as if to fit within or become a sensible participant of that society’s parameters).
- Legislator. This is the individual who (obviously) is responsible for producing the legislation of a society. In order for the society to be well-formed, Rousseau requires this individual to supersede society’s limitations, and in this regard, I find it interesting to compare this person to Plato’s philosopher king, who is similarly fundamental and yet fantastical.
- “Forced to be free”. This is an expression for which Rousseau is infamous, and expresses the ‘fact’ (i.e. as he sees it) that individuals born within a free society are inevitably free, without regard to their preferences. On one hand, this is an expression of a society which attributes to its members a benefit so fundamental that they could not coherently or morally reject. But on the other hand, it expresses the fact that the social contract is what makes its members free, even though it is achieved by transferring power into the creation of the sovereign (nb. a phrase which is neutral as regards form, and may equally apply to a monarchy as to a democracy). Thus, a person who is forced to obey the laws of the society is, by the same act, forced to be free (i.e. since to follow the laws is to be free qua a creator of the sovereign).
- Individual will versus general will. This is a distinction important in parts of Rousseau’s writings, as it allows him to differentiate that the same individual can be responsible for their own preferences but also as a contributor to the general/society’s preferences, even though the latter may contradict and hence override the former.
Quotes and their contexts:
Here I wish to provide some quotes I’ve selected, as well as their context which makes sense of them (and which may also provide an opportunity for expressing areas of Rousseau’s philosophy which I’ve not had opportunity or cause to describe above) or comments to explain my selection of them. Due to the limitations of the scope of my reading, they are all selected from but one of two titles that I’ve actually had the opportunity and commitment to reading (A Lasting Peace and a collection of the two discourses alongside The Social Contract).
The following few quotes are from Rousseau’s text about the benefits and necessary steps towards a state of “lasting peace” throughout Europe (presumably it would not have been easily imagined for there to be an equal peace between members of Europe and the rest of the known world). It is interesting (in one way) for its tone and style, which offer themselves as a fine specimen of Rousseau’s literary and emotional sense or artistry.
I doubt not that many readers will forearm themselves with scepticism, as the best defence against the pleasure of yielding to conviction. I pity the melancholy mood which makes them take obstinacy for wisdom. On the otherhand, I trust that every generous spirit will share the thrill of emotion with which I take up the pen on a subject which concerns mankind so closely. I see in my mind’s eye all men joined in the bonds of love. I call before my thoughts a gentle and peaceful brotherhood, all living in unbroken harmony, all guided by the same principles, all finding their happiness in the happiness of all. And, as I dwell upon this touching picture, the idea of an imaginary happiness will cheat me for a few moments into the enjoyment of a real one. [A Lasting Peace Through the Federation of Europe; And, the State of War; Loc 331-336]
[…] in joining a particular group of men, we have really declared ourselves the enemies of the whole race? [Ibid; Loc 346-347]
Observe the perpetual quarrels, the robberies, the usurpations, the revolts, the wars, the murders, which bring daily desolation to this venerable home of philosophy, this brilliant sanctuary of art and science. Consider our fair speeches and our abominable acts, the boundless humanity of our maxims and the boundless cruelty of our deeds; our religion so merciful and our intolerance so ferocious; our policy so mild in our text-books and so harsh in our acts; our rulers so beneficent and our people so wretched; our Governments so temperate and our wars so savage: and then tell me how to reconcile these glaring contradictions; tell me if this alleged brotherhood of the nations of Europe is anything more than a bitter irony to denote their mutual hatred. [Ibid; Loc 403-408]
Whilst I don’t know to what extent it is actually true, the following sounds to me like a reasonable prediction. I base that suspicion primarily and most particularly on my expectation of the relationship which takes place between states, all the more between states involved in acts of state-aggression (viz. warfare). To a lesser extent, is a reference to history; all parties to WWII displayed a shocking degree of independence from any commitment to true cooperation (nb. all parties, including the Allies, as displayed for example by the stubborn reluctance to open a Western front to support the efforts of the Soviet armies). Thus I like the quote for giving expression to a fundamental feature of states at war.
I doubt whether, since the beginning of the world, there has been a single case in which three, or even two, Powers have joined forces for the conquest of others, without quarrelling over their contingents, or over the division of the spoil, and without, in consequence of this disagreement, promptly giving new strength to their common enemy. [Ibid; Loc 465-467]
Nb. the following is often (arguably famously) paraphrased into the gnomic, “To be sane in a world of madmen is in itself a kind of madness.”
If, in spite of all this, the project remains unrealized, that is not because it is Utopian; it is because men are crazy, and because to be sane in a world of madmen is in itself a kind of madness. [Ibid; Loc 770-771]
The following expresses the current state of affairs. The next two quotes express the false fairness of societies in which the powerful are supported by the state in holding their power against the masses who are warned that they too must defend the state since otherwise, they risk the security of what little they do have.
I see on every side the strong armed with the terrible powers of the Law against the weak. [Ibid; Loc 990]
It is the peace of Ulysses and his comrades, imprisoned in the cave of the Cyclops and waiting their turn to be devoured. [Ibid; Loc 991-992]
And then there’s this, which describes how the states coexist as if in a state of nature, since they do nothing to protect their common interest, and instead treat each other always as a potential threat.
As individuals, we live in the civil state, under the control of the Law; as nations, each is in the state of nature. [Ibid; Loc 1006]
Here on, I quote from the collection of Rousseau’s two discourses plus his famous text The Social Contract.
The following quotes are (until said otherwise) from The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right.
I mean to inquire if, in the civil order, there can be any sure and legitimate rule of administration, men being taken as they are and laws as they might be. [The Social Contract and Discourses; Loc 822-823]
Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. [Ibid; Loc 830-831]
The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked. [Ibid; Loc 1017-1019]
…the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty. [Ibid; Loc 1030-1031]
The following two quotes relate to the legislator, which was described in my comments in a previous section above.
In order to discover the rules of society best suited to nations, a superior intelligence beholding all the passions of men without experiencing any of them would be needed. [Ibid; Loc 1262-1264]
It would take gods to give men laws. [Ibid; Loc 1267]
Here is another extended example of Rousseau’s poetic bent:
The following quote is from Rousseau’s first discourse, with the full title A Discourse Which Won the Prize at the Academy of Dijon in 1750, on This Question Proposed by the Academy: Has the Restoration of the Arts and Sciences Had a Purifying Effect Upon Morals?
It is a noble and beautiful spectacle to see man raising himself, so to speak, from nothing by his own exertions; dissipating, by the light of reason, all the thick clouds in which he was by nature enveloped; mounting above himself; soaring in thought even to the celestial regions; like the sun, encompassing with giant strides the vast extent of the universe; and, what is still grander and more wonderful, going back into himself, there to study man and get to know his own nature, his duties and his end. [Ibid; Loc 2596-2599]
The rest of the quotes by Rousseau are from his second discourse, with the full title A Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences.
Before art had moulded our behaviour, and taught our passions to speak an artificial language, our morals were rude but natural; and the different ways in which we behaved proclaimed at the first glance the difference of our dispositions. [Ibid; Loc 2628-2629]
The following four quotes describe or regard some of the negative effects induced by civilization.
In our day, now that more subtle study and a more refined taste have reduced the art of pleasing to a system, there prevails in modern manners a servile and deceptive conformity; so that one would think every mind had been cast in the same mould. [Ibid; Loc 2631-2633]
We no longer dare seem what we really are, but lie under a perpetual restraint; in the meantime the herd of men, which we call society, all act under the same circumstances exactly alike, unless very particular and powerful motives prevent them. [Ibid; Loc 2634-2636]
Ignorance is held in contempt; but a dangerous scepticism has succeeded it. [Ibid; Loc 2643-2643]
Where there is no effect, it is idle to look for a cause: but here the effect is certain and the depravity actual; our minds have been corrupted in proportion as the arts and sciences have improved. [Ibid; Loc 2652-2653]
I can’t say whether there is an original that these relate to, but the following quote reminds me of one very similar by Umberto Eco (depending on the accuracy of my memory).
…falsehood is capable of an infinite variety of combinations; but the truth has only one manner of being. [Ibid; Loc 2765-2766]
The following two regards man in the state of nature.
If we strip this being, thus constituted, of all the supernatural gifts he may have received, and all the artificial faculties he can have acquired only by a long process; if we consider him, in a word, just as he must have come from the hands of nature, we behold in him an animal weaker than some, and less agile than others; but, taking him all round, the most advantageously organised of any. I see him satisfying his hunger at the first oak, and slaking his thirst at the first brook; finding his bed at the foot of the tree which afforded him a repast; and, with that, all his wants supplied. [Ibid; Loc 3268-3271]
… carrying one’s self, as it were, perpetually whole and entire about one. [Ibid; Loc 3289-3289]
… a thinking man is a depraved animal. [Ibid; Loc 3329-3329]
it is impossible to make any man a slave, unless he be first reduced to a situation in which he cannot do without the help of others. [Ibid; Loc 3705-3706]
Let us reflect what must be the state of things, when men are forced to caress and destroy one another at the same time; when they are born enemies by duty, and knaves by interest. [Ibid; Loc 4242-4244]
The following are from the same book as the one immediate above, but are Rousseau quoting the classics. In all cases translation sourced online, although the original source for the translations are unknown.
Decipimur specie recti. Translated from Latin: We are deceived by the semblance of rectitude. Or: We are deceived by the appearance of right. [Horace from Ars poetica]
Quem te Deus esse jussit et humana qua parte locatus es in re disce. Translated from the Latin: Learn the person God has commanded you to be, And in which part of human affairs you have been placed. [Persius from Opera omnia]
Learned inquiries into public right are often only the history of past abuses; and troubling to study them too deeply is a profitless infatuation. [Essay on the Interests of France in Relation to its Neighbours by the Marquis d’Argenson].
