A list that is not random and that refers to things beyond itself qua list-only:
Content:
- What became known as the Dream-Words.
- Scaruffi: Chapter 4: Part 3.
- Thoughts as I study through WiBit.
- Philosopher Brief: Christian Wolff – Take 4.
What became known as the Dream-Words
Let’s begin by saying that if I can do this, then surely I shall. “But,” assures another, whilst the mechanism of action remains appropriately beyond the scope of construction (which is a cute way of saying…. saying something… I can’t say what precisely), it reveals something I subconsciously knew about. Namely, in succumbing to this risk, I had added entire levels of details hitherto unconsidered (although, at most, within the realm of possibility, and requiring a prompt and a push to approach awareness).
And then the protagonist awoke. He read through the words before him, adding a word here, deleting a full-stop there. His goal was to alter as little as possible, whilst utilizing his intuition in the hope of providing the changes already intended at the time of their writing. His goal was to cease writing and become a reader. His goal (third time lucky…) was to discover the wild-flowers of his subconscious, the ones his consciousness – that force of intersubjectivity, beholden to forces absent from the navigator’s maps – would approve.
Since (i.e. presumption number 1 – which is very much not to suggest at all that I shall count the assumptions here) (i.e. presumably yet beyond the reach of neglect nor successful argument) it looks like the writer (i.e. I) was alternating (or flicking or floundering or…*) between two dimensions of perception/conception. I was writing from both and either an ‘I’ who was the reader (with many implications for the perspective, i.e. from that putative reader’s sake, including, for example, a nature of mystery, mastery and lack thereof, etc) versus an ‘I’ who was the writer (again, with consequent implications of a putative writer’s analysis of the text, including, for-example’s, a nature of intention, metaphor qua artistry, and journey’s into expanses of meaning): That was all a single, overwhelming, mind-confounding, sentence! I could attempt a rewording, but the simplicity of any major quantity would (I believe… assume?) remain elusive.
[*Those arguments were employed for sake of amusement directly, and indirectly for sake of awareness of possibilities.]
And thus I am left with this, i.e. breaking the fourth wall (yet again), this time speaking to say, “The ego is as much a destination as much as it is its directions, and as much an identity as it is the society that births it. What is yin without yang? Is the converse any different? These comments and questions will not solve the problem; it is intractable. Instead, I am suggesting a perspective from whence I can rest, study what was written, and know that beauty is an answer to its own question.”
Is that a clue? Is it being suggested that the dream-words’ nature are aesthetic? Let me put it this way: I’ve no fucking clue 🙂
Scaruffi: Chapter 4: Part 3
Let’s continue; I was in the midst of §4.6, discussing the importance of mental modules for permitting plurality within the context of cognitive capacities, and the concept of a central module with isotropic and Quinian properties.
- 4.7 (Dimensions of Cognition): The major criticisms against production systems involve the statement that they don’t ‘look’ like our brain/thought-processes. To this end, and in an effort to salvage these theories and models, Marr and Newell have described ‘different levels of cognition’, with the idea, down-stream, that different sciences (e.g. molecular neurobiology, psychology, etc) are describing the same phenomenon at different levels. From that (i.e. the theory of levels of cognition) it follows that in order to study any sort of cognition (e.g. knowledge of goal-driven behaviour) one must first define/place oneself within that/the relevant dimension. This is an attempt to negate a problem in a way that practically abolishes it completely (e.g. whilst production systems may be significantly different and non-correlative with ‘normal’ formats of cognition, that is only the case if one fails to abstract oneself to the relevant dimension, namely precisely that dimension wherein production systems operate. Nb. in order to prevent hypotheses from becoming tautological, one must precisely define the dimension within one’s solution relies, in order to allow alternative hypotheses to compete fairly. One particular alternative to logic based models of cognition is mental models.
- 4.8 (Mental Models): I.e. Using model building rather than logical production rules, which ‘looks’ more like how we think. That can be argued by reference to children: Children solve problems by imagining how the circumstance operates, and then imagining alternatives within that model, including alternative parameters that result in an outcome desired by the child.
The coiner of this concept, Johnson-Laird, did not believe this to be the only mould of cognition – there were two others apparently, propositions (e.g. in language), and images (e.g. in perception), although mental models were said to be the main mode.
Others who played around with this paradigm included:
- Fauconnier, who wrote of ”mental spaces” within which mental models could be generated and played with by the mind, and which could undergo ‘conceptual blending’, which is as it sounds, and which is important for creative thinking.
- Lakoff wrote about the internal structure of Fauconnier’s mental spaces, and his theory was ”idealized cognitive models”, an important point of which was the significance of embodiment for conception.
- 4.9 (Mental Imagery) and §4.10 Mindsight and §4.11 (Semantics and Pragmatics of Vision all regard (as would be assumed from the hints provided) sight, both the kind that sees the world, and the kind that sees ”stuff” inside the mind (whatever that means, which itself is an item for discussion/argument). While vision is relevant for cognition, namely, their respective understandings, I’ve chosen not to elaborate these subsections here, on the conclusion that aside from their historical significance, they do not provide any major insight into the primary questions of this chapter.
Coming up next: §4.12 (The Frame).
Thoughts as I study through WiBit
So I changed around from just doing Java, to starting at WiBit’s very beginning. (For more information, especially a little about the justification for that change, see what I wrote a mere one day ago). Now then… let’s talk about what I’ve learned, and what I’ve impressions I’ve gained, in particular as I watched these Intro videos:
Lesson 1 was basically just wish-wash about what programming is, and some factoids on what a career therein entails.
Lesson 2 is a lead-in for its successor, describing the history of language, the lineage of generations, from machine language upwards. So that lesson 3 gives a couple of slides on each of C, C++, C#, Perl, HTML, JavaScript, PHP, Objective-C, Java, SQL, TCL, and Visual Basic. I’m not going to discuss the details provided therein, but having watched the videos in this lesson I have a minimum familiarity with what each language is – thus, e.g. when any particular language is mentioned in a sentence I have a reference in mind that is a little more complicated than ‘some programming language’. I’m probably not going to remember much about any of these, beyond a vague impression. Which is enough for now. In effect, it’s a primitive and weak form of the broad foundation I’m wanting to gain through these courses (i.e. as opposed to the Java course which I want to teach me so as to eventually be capable of programming).
Philosopher Brief: Christian Wolff – Take 4
Meta: Here I am (virtually) continuing what was dated to just yesterday. There I had tracked my Notes, beginning with Epistemology, and continuing up until Theoretical Philosophy, including its subsections Ontology and then Cosmology. Thus, turning to my Notes, I’ll pick up where I left off, which was the three levels of descriptions Wolff utilizes in his Cosmology.
Cosmology
The level of appearances (aka sensible reality) allows for comprehension of bodie and their phenomenal properties (e.g. extension, inertia). As it is the level in which we practically live, (since simples of the lowest levels are without size, and corpuscles in the intermediate level are too small for practical division) it is also the level of bodies’ secondary properties.
Wolff uses a primary/secondary distinction like Locke, but holds all sensible properties to be secondary. He agrees that secondary properties are phenomenal, mind-dependent, with a causal origin in objective reality – namely in the simples (cf. Locke would say in corpuscles).
Although all bodies exist in space and time, not all beings exist in space: Atomic elements (i.e. those beings observed when viewing reality at the lowest, atomic level) do not have spatial dimensions, and in that sense (which is a limited and somewhat confusing sense) do not exist in space. The reason that this sense is limited/confusing is that we can still speak of the spatial relations of atomic elements. The difference in these two considerations of space, with their implications for how we speak of space of atomic elements, corresponds with a distinction between conceptions of space for which Wolff utilizes two different terms:
Particular space is what a body fills by virtue of its corpuscular composition (i.e. derived from interacting material atoms which in turn derive from atomic elements although for those atomic elements in their own right particular space is a non sequitur).
Compare that with general space, which is the order of coexisting bodies. Note that this space lacks an objective reality per se, and is an abstraction from the coexisting things (i.e. it is a mode of relations, or even possibly a mode of relations of relations).
Whereas space exists in a dependent manner, time exists at all levels of description. This is assured by its existence in atomic elements, since even they have a constant internal change. Precisely what that means is unclear, but in some way reflects the idea of them having an internal nature which determines their actions, and which must be in a constant state of flux, possibly in order to make sense of time at all. Like general space, time is not an objective measure but rather a mode of relations (relating in some way to coexistence, although that is a property that too depends on time for our comprehension of it).
Returning to the question of space, and in particular what it means for bodies to be comprised of simples: Atomic elements interact in a way that only looks like what we would call physical influence (i.e. repulsion and attraction), but the actions that are responsible for these phenomena are temporal communication (viz. the coherence of the internal character of many simples). An analogy is provided for understanding this: Just like many rings of a bell can sound like a single extended note, so too can many atomic forces appear as a single object.
Psychology
Wolff has two easily distinguishable approaches to the problems of psychology: rational and empirical.
But although he does utilize empirical methodology, practically it serves as a complementary tool to his main route (viz. rational means). His writings on empirical psychology explore the fact of introspective experience, on the basis of which he proposes a nominal definition of the soul, that is, “that being in use which is conscious of itself and of other things outside us.” But the nominal definition is just that, and its worth depends on proceeding to apply the PSR and thus the rational methodology, from which he proposes a real definition.
Thus, rationally, “The essence of the soul world by consists in the force of representing the world by virtue of the soul’s ability to sense […] and by its corresponding body’s situation in the world.” (Rational Psychology §66)
An implication of the real definition of the soul is (just like it is for Leibniz) that the principal function of the soul is representation (i.e. form thoughts about things). But (unlike Leibniz) Wolff’s soul is not windowless, meaning that the representations achieved by the soul occur by its interaction (by whatever mechanism, indirect or otherwise) with that thing that it shows to consciousness.
Other interests for Wolff within the domain of rational psychology include explaining the laws that govern the soul’s operations (and for which he was accused of attempting to mechanize the soul, as if trying to apply Newton’s methods of physics to mental existence), and also addressing the mind-body problem. Wolff explains interactionism by, after a process of elimination of alternative theories, pre-established harmony (and so agrees with Leibniz’s principle).
Natural Theology
This is a field I am not interested in, so my comments will accordingly be brief: Wolff defines natural theology as “the science of those things that are possible through God” (Natural Theology §1), and represents it as the end of metaphysics insofar as it covers the ends of possibility (nb. which are the objects of metaphysics). Regarding the substance of Wolff’s philosophy here, he offers arguments for the existence of God, none of which are particularly original (although I acknowledge that the particulars may be – such a distinction is beyond my education and care), as well as describing the essential attributes of God, and the implications for possibility that follow from those attributes. (So what?)
Practical Philosophy
This I believe, sits outside his architectonic of theoretical philosophy (which would be apt, given the respective and opposing labels, but which itself contains four interests: Universal practical law, natural law, politics, and moral philosophy.
The unifying principle of his practical philosophy is the principle of perfection, which is the goal of human existence and (reasonably as a consequence thereof, although I am not aware of any particular arguments) therefore the goal of human morality. In other words, our goal is to achieve the highest degree of perfection in ourselves and in others (including humankind as a delineated target), and this measures our moral worth.
He describes the correlation between (respectively) pleasure/displeasure and actions that tend towards/away from perfection. This aspect of Wolff’s philosophy resembles consequentialism and seems to label it (to whatever extent) a utilitarian philosophy. In any case, Wolff’s ethics are certainly not theologically based, as he argues for the independence of universal ethics from religious (i.e. scriptural) teachings, although (no surprise) he holds them to be compatible.
