“Now” keeps changing, leading me to doubt whether it ever is.
Contents:
- Philosopher Brief: Christian Wolff – Take 3
- Diary: Studying Java and Wibit on programming
- Some words on Scaruffi: Gaining perspective on chapter 4 – Part 2
Philosopher Brief: Christian Wolff – Take 3
Meta: Title notwithstanding, and long-story aside, this is the second substantial effort at writing a brief on Wolff, and the first one since having completed the study of the encyclopedia entry detailing his story. My previous entry had focused on and explored the intellectual interaction and history of Leibniz versus Wolff. I had described in brief principles what separated the two philosophies, and the biographical circumstances that supported that divergence. By contrast, here, I will be focusing on Wolff without – or at least, hardly – mentioning Leibniz. I will distribute the elaboration of Wolff’s philosophy into three categories. Most of all will be written about Wolff’s epistemology, and theoretical philosophy, and less about the third category, practical philosophy (into which I shoehorn, without the support of Wolff, natural theology). (Whether or not I will complete this effort is another matter, but for now, I am tracking what I have written in my document, “2013_11_14_Note on Wolff”, and will follow what goes.
Epistemology
Wolff’s epistemology (or at least, what I include under that heading, which is a caveat/can-of-worms I’d rather not explore/open-myself, for fear of what difficulties may follow), is a categorization of our knowledge (ie. different ways of dividing knowledge according to how it is achieved, or its topics), including the tools/means that allow our engagement of it.
Indubitable self-knowledge
Just like Descartes, Wolff’s epistemology begins with a realization that we have indubitable self-knowledge (i.e. I think, therefore I am). From this cornerstone, we are capable of providing a basis for knowledge of ourselves, external matter, and the existence of both those categories of things.
The two faculties of knowledge
That begins to answer, “What do we know”, but it hardly approaches, “How (by what means) do we know”. That second question is answered by referral to “What are the components (capacities) of the mind”, namely, the faculty of sense/imagination, and the faculty of understanding/reason. It is not made clear, but I understand that bifurcation of mental capacities to correspond with the two levels (Wolff describes) of human knowledge, namely, common/vulgar knowledge (i.e. the natural way) and scientific knowledge (i.e. historical, philosophical, and mathematical modes of knowing – see below). These two levels are not absolutely isolated, as “certitude” (which is the goal of the human mind) bridges the two.
Knowledge qua logic
When speaking of “How does the mind work”, besides just saying that it uses sense or reason, it should also be said that all these different patterns of thought can all be copied into an artificial logic. This means that no matter what the mode of mental processing is (i.e. that results in human thought), it is always a mode of logic (i.e. human thought is an expression of logic via an organic host).
Science
Returning to the two levels of thought: The level of scientific thought, i.e. the basis for science, is what allows the mind to order its thoughts. That capacity results in an ordered knowledge (i.e. science) which can be given a hierarchical form, and each level of understanding can be translated into a generalization/specification of its lower/higher respective levels. For example, chemistry is more fundamental than biology, but less than physics).
Philosophy qua fundamental science
If we travel up the chain of knowledge, the most fundamental science (remembering that “science” is the ordering of knowledge according to the mind’s principles, which include among others a basis in logic) is philosophy. Wolff defines it as “the science of all possible things, together with the manner and reason of their possibility.” It has two branches, practical philosophy, and theoretical philosophy. These will be dealt with below, but it suffices to say at the moment, that this bifurcation reflects distinction within philosophy (i.e. the most fundamental science) between (theoretical) the science of being, actual and possible [and so the science of “things” as distinct from “I”], and (practical) the science of a being defined from the perspective of experience and choice.
Knowledge qua laws (of logic)
Having understood the basis for our knowledge within the fields of all knowledge (i.e. what we know {in terms of “things” of knowledge}, how do we know it {in terms of mental tools}, what is the structure of our knowledge {i.e. how do our “things” of knowledge, qua knowledge, relate to each other})… Wolff can explain the laws of knowledge (i.e. what makes x an item of knowledge), and he does so by discussing the logical principles that justify it.
Note that even after explaining the relations within knowledge, and the items which can become its set, etc., it is still informative for Wolff to explain that logic is [sort-of] the language that knowledge uses (including what justifies it). Thus by explaining the logical laws that allow an expansion (etc) of knowledge, we are (roughly) explaining (a.) how the dots of knowledge connect, (b.) how knowledge is experienced, and (c.) break-down the certitude which is the goal of all knowledge.
POC
Let’s start with the most fundamental principle of thought, and the ultimate source of certitude: Principle of contradiction (POC): A being is something if it intrinsically possible, for it to be possible its predicates must not be contradictory. This is contrasted by “nothing”, which is a term that refers to empty content, (it’s hard to describe, since it is not thinkable, nor properly conceivable).
POC is the only indemonstrable self-evident truth; all axiomatic principles are derivable from POC, and all true propositions depend on POC for their proofs (nb. even empirical statements utilize POC for their proofs).
PSR
The principle of sufficient reason (PSR) is what makes possible his definition and exploration of philosophy (recall: “the science of all possible things, together with the manner and reason of their possibility.”) Like POC, it is an axiom of thought (i.e. makes our thoughts possible), but is not completely underivable, since it can be derived from POC. It is not completely above our mental landscape, and/as it justifies aspects of our experience (i.e. those relating to PSR, namely the way PSR doesn’t contradict experience, it is recognized in our experience, and we display curiosity towards future/unrevealed “experience”/information).
(Regarding the significance of curiosity for PSR, and its justification, note that it reveals something about our existential nature. Our entire consciousness is based around the principle – i.e. the PSR – that everything is connected, and that to exist as a conscious being is to travel along this web of interconnection. Curiosity is a manifestation of this unconscious understanding, {so much so, that if we believe that something is fundamentally impossible to be known, we take that as an affront to our very being; a frustration that extends to the core of our being, although some would challenge that designation by saying that since it might as well not exist, it is just as accurate to say that it doesn’t exist, i.e. possibility for human understanding thus becomes a criteria for existence/possibility of being}).
Theoretical Philosophy
Wolff’s theoretical philosophy is expected from his division of the most fundamental science, philosophy, into two parts according to those things that follow from being a conscious/acting being, and those that are understood from without as things within the world (and which can be the targets of consciousness and action). He divides theoretical philosophy into three branches: ontology (metaphysics proper), special metaphysics, and physics. Special metaphysics includes general cosmology, psychology, and natural theology.
Ontology
This is the study of being (especially its categorization). A lot of what goes into describing Wolff’s ontology is describing his jargon, as will become manifest shortly.
A being is any possible thing, which is defined by its essential nature (which for a possible thing, i.e. its essence, is called its principle of being/individuation). These essential properties are compatible (i.e. non-contradictory between themselves), primer (i.e. determined in their own right, and not by other things/properties), and ultimately are not accidents of the substance but rather together form the substance itself.
A real thing with a unique combination of essential properties translates to a unique substance, which is called a “simple substance” (nb. the only substantial thing to exist at any level of reality) and contrasts with composite beings. Those exist insofar as the accidents of a simple substance, or a set of simple substances, are linked/arranged together, and is/are defined by the manner in which its/their parts are combined.
Possible beings can have accidents, which are those properties that exist by virtue of the being’s essentials; they exist in three classes: (1) proper attributes determined by all of the essentials, (2) common attributes determined by some of the essentials, while (3) modes are contingent properties whose presence is contingent on the state of affairs.
Cosmology
This is a part of special metaphysics. It is a study of the world-whole in general. This means studying the actual stuff that makes up the world, and is more tangible than the ontological study of beings in general.
I’ll begin by exploring what Wolff means by the “world”: The world is an extended composite of composite beings, or to quote Wolff:
The world is a collection of mutable things that are next to each other, follow upon one another, and are entirely connected with one another. [German Metaphysics, §544]
There are different ways of looking at these “things”. One is bottom-up versus top-down. That differentiates a metaphysical view (bodies qua aggregates of simple substances) and mechanistic view (bodies qua subject of senses that are interacting corpuscles).
Alternatively, there are three levels of description that Wolff uses.
- Atomic-level. Made up of simple substances (aka simples, elements, atoms of nature). They are real, indivisible, unextended points of force, that lack internal motion yet maintain a constant state of change, allowing for individuation based on that internal state.
Although some later Wolffians would call these monads, this is misleading insofar as Leibniz’s were windowless whilst Wolffs do interact/influence each other.
- Microphysical level. Made up of parts called corpuscles (aka material atoms); their essence is given by the manner in which their parts are joined.
- Level of appearance (i.e. sensible reality).
Diary: Studying Java and Wibit on programming
So I finished watching the first lesson of the Java course on WiBit.net, and they made a strong point at the end there, saying that they (personally) believe (i.e. a google quickly reveals the range and for some intensity, of opinions) that Java is not a good place to start learning programming. And I will say that whilst, admittedly, I do not have a good grasp on the arguments (and there are various, both on WiBit and by others) for working one’s way from C through the “lineage” to Java, nonetheless I’ve become convinced that this is a tenable approach for myself. I’ll emphasize the point that this is “tenable” for myself, that being so precisely because of the WiBit resource. By working my way through WiBit, I can gain a broad foundation upon which to build any sort of programming knowledge. My conclusion being, that while I will work my way through the C-lineage, my goal remains the same, namely, a study of Java for programming (which itself is part of the journey towards a further destination).
Insofar as what the arguments for this approach are in my head (viz. flawed, limited, idiosyncratic, and very much personally regarded), they are the clumsily construed and constructed following: (i.) C is a purer and less appended language, allowing me to see a more primitive language first, and only then to add on more conceptually advanced features as I move through history and through language, which links me to the second point… (ii.) By starting at C and ending at Java I am moving through history, so that the same (crude and merely-roughly considered) arguments that apply to my “philosophy through time” methodology. (iii.) And thirdly, and for the present moment final (nb. only because I’ve not considered this very well – no doubt if I sat down with time, an internet and a pencil I could come up with a list-less embarrassingly skimpy) argument for the C-lineage approach, as endorsed by WiBit, is (and I can only hope that this isn’t terribly-terribly incorrect) that because C is closer to machine language, I can come to a technically closer understanding of its workings, and consequentially I will have a closer understanding of those features as they exist in parallel in the latter, higher-level languages like Java.
An immediate, practical consequence of this change of philosophy, is that I’ve ceased my study of Java at WiBit (I had finished the first 8-parts of lesson 1, nb. there remained a few extra bits before I’d completely completed the first lesson therein), and will instead begin WiBit from their very beginning. The first course at WiBit (which I had dismissed immediately upon first sight) is called “Introduction to Computer Programming”. I do, still, hold onto a negative opinion of this lesson, but for now I figure “why not” and “it can’t hurt” and “let’s hear them out, it’s not like it costs all that much”, which is not to say that I’m completely stoic in the face of “what needs to be done”, since that last statement is not all that true. Essentially I still believe that I’ll be wasting time achieving what I could achieve quicker and faster by other means, but my argument is as follows: By undertaking this generic lesson I will learn a handful of useful tidbits along with facts and philosophies which will complement my eventual study of the core (i.e. language-specific, programming) lessons. As a limited case-in-point, as I type this, lesson 1.2 is playing (they’re, incidentally, talking about the benefits and limitations of a programming career).
All that said, that’s all said from a “here” and “now”, for further judgment and realization of opinions, I’ll have to see what happens. Which will, and I’ll see what happens after that too.
Some words on Scaruffi: Gaining perspective on chapter 4 – Part 2
Meta: As indicated by that title, this is my continuation of a writeup previously established. There I had essentially written about the contents of chapter 4 from its beginning, up to a description of ACT and SOAR in §4.5 (Production Systems). Here I continue onwards, adding a few more words about production systems, before moving onto the next subsection.
- 4.5 (continued): Production systems explain the algorithm (putatively) involved in cognition, without explicitly stating how those algorithms are affected. Instead, it is tacitly assumed that those algorithms utilize symbolic processing (for which see §4.4). One of the strengths of this paradigm (i.e. of cognition) is that it addresses an issue Scaruffi raised in his closing statements in the preceding chapter 3. There he had written that to understand intelligence, which is the challenge evoked by the story of machine intelligence, perhaps we would be better served by defining or delineating our goal as relevant to problem-solving. That is to say (something along the lines of), “What is (intelligence understood as) the capacity for problem-solving?”, which entails, “How does the mind utilize problem generation to interact with the world?” and “How can de novo problems be generated appropriately?” which is related to the similar question, “How are novel questions faced?” (i.e. with the goal of problem-solving). Thus, returning to the present text (of chapter 4, i.e. §4.5 and the role of production systems), we can suggest that the model of cognition qua production system, suggests a basic and partial framework for a mental entity that must utilize problem-solving as part of its capacity for being.
While (obviously) “being” is a very abstract concept (although suitably so for something like a computer), when we turn to organisms it suddenly becomes apt, and we can start to utilize these concepts (e.g. production system) in explaining what organisms are. But there (obviously) remain (and are introduced) significant issues (including problems per se). For example, a train of thought could look like, “An organism can use production systems, encoded in some physical format, e.g. neurological, of symbols. But it is difficult to explain how all these different abilities, (whose plurality is assumed by our language although the state of affairs could conceivably be argued against), could be the result of this mere capacity (i.e. the capacity of production systems). Before re-stating the problem, I would first want to address the nature of this “mere capacity”. It might, for instance, be the transformation of “knowing-that” into “knowing-how”, aka the relationship between theory and action. But then why so varied? Perhaps because the world itself is varied (e.g. sound versus light), or our goals are varied (e.g. food versus mating), or something else… whatever else it may be or in fact is, I would emphasize that these two epitomize a fundamental dichotomy, viz. between the self-pole and the other-pole.
- 4.6 (Mental Modules): Another approach to the problem of mental plurality is to assume that the mind or mental-capacities is-itself/are-themselves plural. That is to say, systems (whether “production systems” or of another type) exist plurally within a mind. Furthermore, the mind is made up of systems that are modular, and these modules utilize innate/biological rules. These innate rules should be considered similar/akin to the hypotheses of people like Chomsky (speaking of language) or Marr (speaking of vision) or (Putnam’s PhD student) Fodor (speaking of mind).
In all these models, the modules process information syntactically via rules that are fundamentally innate/biological. Furthermore, all modules must eventually connect to a central module that is isotropic (i.e. can build a hypothesis based on any sort of knowledge) and Quinian (i.e. the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis is conditioned by the entire system of beliefs).
